PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA, CENTRE FOR CONTEMPORARY KOREAN STUDIES: First of all, I really estimate it as a good sign that they have announced this probable test beforehand.

GEORGE NEGUS: Why is that?

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: Well, probably that's the lesson of the missile tests in July this year, when most of the criticism North Korea received was not because of the test itself but the lack of announcement. So this sort of announcement means that there is a possibility that they won't do it.

GEORGE NEGUS: There is a possibility they won't do it because they have announced that they are going to?

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: Yes. Well, they have announced they going to do it due time.

GEORGE NEGUS: Yes. What does that mean?

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: That means that the conditions for that should be right for them. And that means that, well, this is sort of an invitation for dialogue. That means - I interpret that - that if their opponents would engage in serious negotiation, if they would feel that their security can be guaranteed by means other than a nuclear deterrent, they might actually abstain from nuclear testing.

GEORGE NEGUS: So what about the people who say this is yet another example of brinkmanship, and words like 'ploy' are being used and 'feint' and 'bluff'.

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: And you can call it brinkmanship, you can call it a bluff, but the...the outcome is that their diplomacy is pretty effective.

GEORGE NEGUS: Yes, they have gotten away with it. If it is bluff, if it is brinkmanship, they have gotten away with it for a long time, considering how high the stakes are.

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: Yes. But well, what other reserves to do they have? They don't have any great military power, although what is written in the West. They don't have many resources, they don't have many friends. So the only thing they actually have is this kind of diplomatic reserve and asymmetrical answers. For example, when the United States imposed economic sanctions on their accounts, they answer asymmetrically - first by missile tests, now it might be a nuclear test.

GEORGE NEGUS: Do you believe them when they say that they have nuclear weapons now?

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: No-one would know until they test it. I think they don't probably know themselves.

GEORGE NEGUS: It is almost Catch 33, isn't it?

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: It is.

GEORGE NEGUS: The only way we'll find out whether they have a nuclear weapon is if we allow them to go ahead and test. But isn't this going to be, ultimately, a matter of pretty intense and delicate negotiation? And what role does the US play in all this? Are they prepared to make the compromises necessary, is it negotiable? Is the situation actually ever going to be negotiable?

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: Yes, it is. And history has shown that in 1990s, under the Democratic US administration, the negotiation resulted in a freeze in North Korean nuclear program. And North Koreans really expected the US to honour their obligations as to, well, to construct the light-water reactors, to improve relations, but this was slow in coming. But anyway, this period of negotiations and compromises made this area quite secure, it was more or less stable.
And you know that at that time the North-South dialogue started and the improvement in relations between Pyongyang and the West have started. But the lack of negotiations, on the contrary, and the policy of trying to pressure this nation, this policy have so far had very negative results. We now have North Korea testing missiles, working on plutonium, probably now for 6-8 bombs. I don't know - that's what the press writes. And so now we come to the threshold of North Korea really becoming a nuclear power.

GEORGE NEGUS: Do you believe that they can become a nuclear power? I mean, if this dialogue that you're talking about, that is possible now because of this announcement, if that doesn't happen, is that the case that if they are not a nuclear power, they will certainly become one?

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: That's a development that nobody would want to see. It is quite quite probable. It is quite probable. No-one would know unless they test the device. And, well, anyway, even if they test it, no-one would know what kind of device it is. Maybe it is just a trainload of dynamite, who knows? I'm just joking of course. But the dialogue still can improve the situation because what they, North Korea, needs are security guarantees, security assurances.

GEORGE NEGUS: Security against what?

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: Security guarantees against attempts to topple their regime, to undermine their political system.

GEORGE NEGUS: Security against regime change, to use the contemporary term?

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: Yes, yes, it is. Exactly.

GEORGE NEGUS: "Leave us alone, let us be what we are, strange as we may seem."

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: Yes. The situation is that actually North Koreans, they want to change. They started market reforms, they started co-operation with the South Korea very earnestly. They were on the road to improving relations with Japan - solving historical issues of kidnaps and of the historical compensation. So they were on the road of changes at least up till the year 2002. And I'm sure that if they should be given real security guarantees, should they really be sure that nobody is going to undermine their regime, to change their system, to change their leadership, I think they could go down this road pretty far.

GEORGE NEGUS: So the dialogue is absolutely essential, as you see it, otherwise we don't know where this is all going to end?

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: Yes, dialogue is absolutely essential. And I think that the best format is 6-party talks because Of course much depends on the US position but the US, North Korean negotiations, they are looking for compromises, shouldn't be necessarily bilateral. They should be a part of the 6-party process as well. The other six, well four, parties could help North Korea and US come to a compromise.

GEORGE NEGUS: Professor, I'd love to talk to you more because you spent so much time there yourself, thanks very much for your time.

PROFESSOR GEORGI D. TOLORAYA: Thank you.

Producer / Researcher
CATHY CAREY

Interview Editor
JASON DIEPEVEEN