ROLF EKEUS, FORMER CHIEF UN WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Well, the justification is one thing. Obviously the reports, I think, were solid, adequate and what they described was Iraq's ambitions with regard to weapons production. They also described that there were no real weapons left in the end of '97, '98.

MARK DAVIS: So in your opinion, were their stockpiles of weapons at the beginning of 2003 of a chemical and biological nature?

ROLF EKEUS: It was clear when UNSCOM was forced to close down, I finished myself '97 and Richard Butler at the end of '98 that there could be hardly any stockpiles. There could be old weapons here and there but definitely no massive stockpiles. However, the question was what had happened while the weapons inspectors were out of the country between '98 and 2002?

MARK DAVIS: Well Hans Blix has also very recently said that in his opinion, there were no chemical or biological stockpiles at the time of this war. That's certainly not the impression that the public around the world was given. Did you object to that impression being given that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons grade material?

ROLF EKEUS: We were clear that Iraq's weapons program had been closed down by the inspectors. The question was could they have been revitalised during the four years without international control and that was maybe a guesswork if they could be. I think the major, good plausible explanation is that Iraq would try to preserve its potential, its capability one day when they wanted to acquire weapons again and I guess that is maybe what is the present problem.

MARK DAVIS: Well, that's certainly a different level of danger than was being discussed internationally. If you're now saying that in your opinion the program was closed down, in Hans Blix's opinion, stockpiles did not exist, the question would have to be asked why did we go to war and why was Hans Blix so ambiguous on this issue earlier in the year and indeed why did you maintain your silence?

ROLF EKEUS: I think I was crystal clear in the time before the war, I made clear that there were all the Russian missiles, more than 800 missiles capable of being modified into long range capabilities had been accounted for. We made clear that the huge chemical weapons stocks existing after the Kuwait war in the early '90s were systematically destroyed by UNSCOM during the coming years, '93 through '94. I made very clear that there was a secret, massive biological weapons program in Iraq, which was finally demolished with the systematic eradication of the big al-Hakim facility in the summer of '96. The question was psychological, political. Did Saddam intend to come back to his weapons? I guess that was a political judgment saying, "This guy needs these weapons to oppress his population." He did it before with killing Kurds, he did it in his massive 8-year war against Iran.

MARK DAVIS: But was that really the question that was being debated in the last 12 months? The issue of the stockpile was a critical one. George Bush terrified the world by asserting that Saddam Hussein had 30,000 litres of anthrax and Tony Blair added that it could be deployed in 45 minutes. Now when you heard those claims, did you believe those claims and if not, what was your response? Did you do anything about that?

ROLF EKEUS: No, on the second point, the matter of activation 45 minutes, I was highly sceptical. I think I was on record saying that it could be one odd bits and pieces, a couple of pieces of ammunition but certainly not major, I would say, military quality warfare was possible within that short timeframe.

MARK DAVIS: So is it fair to say that apart from the need for inspections to ensure ongoing compliance by the mid '90s, Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons program had ceased?

ROLF EKEUS: Yeah, we kept them down. It was impossible because I think we had UNSCOM succeeded to identify all potential, civilian and those capabilities and kept them under total control. That was very effective control and very short inspection system, which prevented any recurrence of the weapons.

MARK DAVIS: What I'm suggesting, sir, is, wouldn't it have been very useful to all of us if we had this kind of clarity from yourself, but in a retired position, or from Hans Blix at the beginning of this year?

ROLF EKEUS: Well, I don't know what Hans Blix's ideas but I'm quite sure that as I said, I was clear to a degree - I think I was interviewed also by Australian media and News Night and so on.

MARK DAVIS: Well, in February of this year, you said that you were convinced that there are production facilities in Iraq and they're just extremely well hidden. Do you still believe that?

ROLF EKEUS: Well now we have to be little, so to say, sophisticated and look well hidden. It's not to separate secret program somewhere under the sand. What we are talking about are, existing civilian production facilities. All the scientists, all the process engineers, all the chemists knowing every bit and piece out of this is quite easy to reconstitute chemical weapons production and nerve agent and mustard agent the same will be in biological field.

MARK DAVIS: But with regard to those experienced scientists who you believe could have restarted the program, short of perhaps shooting them, what could Iraq do to ensure that that scientific expertise was dismantled?

ROLF EKEUS: That was my view that we could not trust that Iraqi scientists - we shouldn't shoot them but my view was, and there I think I had very solid backing, was we should control them, we should continue with the inspections and I was quite upset as I know my friend and colleague Richard Butler was when the Security Council broke up in '98 and didn't support UNSCOM's presence because UNSCOM's presence was the full guarantee that no new weapons would be produced.

MARK DAVIS: Rolf Ekeus, thanks again for your time and thanks again for joining us.

ROLF EKEUS: Thank you.